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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UNDER OUR
CONSTITUTIONS*

BY

KENNETH E. MICHAEL**

Any consideration of the subject of freedom' of the

press 2 under our constitutions3 for the sake of clearness

most necessarily include: First, a brief historical survey of
the high points in the development of freedom of the press
as we have it today; Second, an examination of the authorities for the purpose of determining the status of freedom
of the press under our Federal and West Virginia constitutions, together with a presentation of the leading problems
in this field in connection with a discussion of the various
methods of restricting, the liberty of the press; and finally,
a consideration of those general principles which should
be adhered to by our courts in the interpretation of those
constitutional provisions which affect the freedom of the
press.
Before proceeding further with this inquiry it is perhaps advisable to call attention to certain conclusions which
* The James F. Brown Prize Thesis, 1925-26. In 1919 the late James F. Brown,
of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested by it and the
income used as a prize for the best essay each year on the subject of the individual
liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitutions. Any senior or any graduate of any College of the University, within one year after receiving his bachelor's
degree, may compete for this prize.
** LL. B., West Virginia University, 1925, Morgantown, West Virginia.
1 The words "freedom" and "liberty" are treated here as synonymous terms.
We are, of course, primarily concerned with mental freedom here. An early
writer sums up his conclusions on this point in these words: 'It is the opinions men
entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they
deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom." AN
EssAY ON LiBERTY: JOHN STUART MSL, 1859.
There are few expositions of the principle of liberty which can surpass that given
by Charles Evans Hughes. He said: "It is important to remember, as has well been
said, that the essential characteristic of true liberty is, that under its shelter, many
different types of life and character and opinion and belief can develop-unmoleted and
unobstructed * * * * Let not the vital principle be obscured by mere discussions of
constitutional power * * * * Some may still entertain the notion that democracy means
liberty * * * * (But) Democracy has its own capacity for tyranny. Some of the most
menacing encroachments upon liberty invoke the democratic principle and assert the
right of the majority to rule * * * * The interests of liberty are peculiarly those of
individuals, and hence of minorities, and freedom is in danger of being slain at her
own altars if the passion for uniformity and control of opinion gathers head * * * *
We are apt to he unmindful of the other aspects of liberty and of the supreme aim and
justification of the law-making of free men and women, which should ever be found, not
in the satisfactions of the lust of power, not in an imperious domination and command
of uniformity, but in the purpose to secure the freedom of the individual-an ordered
freedom, but still freedom--subject only to such restraints as a sound and tolerant
judgment determines to be essential to the mutuality of liberty * * * After all allowances are made for multiplying laws and complex administration, after all the proper
demands of an intricate social life have been fairly met. there still remain the old
categories-or let us call them citadels-of individual liberty which are not to be
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must be patent to all who have made a careful investigasurrendered. What are these? The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
described them in these words: 'Liberty denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraints, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' " "Liberty and the Law," an address by
Charles Evans Hughes before the American Bar Association, 2 AM. B. Asso. Joun. 668,
Italics ours.
Speaking of the guaranties of liberty in Our Bills of Rights, Dean Pound of Harvard Law School says: "Liberty in such connections was taken to mean, In the
Nineteenth Century, and still is sometimes taken to mean, that the individual shall not
be held legally unless for a fault, unless for an act on his part which infringes another's
right, and that another shall not be perniitted to exact of him except as and to the
extent he has willed a relation to which the law in advance attached such power to
exact"
PouND, SnuRT OF THE COMMON LAW, 143.
Walter Lippmann, referring to the prosecutions under the Espionage Act during
the recent World War, writes: "From our recent experience it is clear that the traditional liberties of speech and opinion rest on no solid foundation * * * * suppression Is
felt, not simply by the scattered individuals who are actually suppressed. It reaches
back into the steadiest minds, creating tension everywhere; and the tension of fear
produces sterility. Men cease to say what they think; and when they cease to say It
they soon cease to think it, They think in reference to their critics and not In reference to the facts * * * * We have learned that many of the hard won rights of man
are utterly insecure. It may be that we cannot make them secure by Imitating the
earlier champions of liberty.
Lippmann makes it clear that the classic absolutist doctrine of liberty has no place
in a practical world. "There are," be says, "so far as I can discover, no absolutists of
liberty. I can recall no doctrine of liberty, which, under the acid test, does not become
contingent upon some other ideal. The goal is never liberty, but liberty for something
or other. For liberty is a condition under which activity takes place, and men's Interests
attach themselves primarily to their activities and what is necessary to fulfill them, not
the abstract requirements of any activity that might be conceived * * * * The classic
doctrine of liberty consists of absolutes. It consists of them except at the critical
points where the author has come into contact with objective difficulties. Then he
introduces into the argument, somewhat furtively, a reservation which liquidates its
universal meaning and reduces the exalted plea for liberty In general to a special
argument for the success of a special purpose * * * We are peculiarly inclined tb suppress whatever impugns the security of that to which we have given our allegiance.
* * * What each seems to say is that opinion and action should be free; that liberty
is the highest and most sacred interest of life. But some where each of them Inserts a
weasel clause to the effect that 'of course' the freedom granted shall not be employed too
destructively. It is this clause which checks exuberance and reminds us that, in spite of
appearances, we are listening to finite men pleading a special cause. Among the English
classics none are more representative than Milton's Areopagitica and the Essay on Liberty
by John Stuart Mill. Of living men Mr. Bertrand Russell is perhaps the most outstanding advocate of liberty. Yet nothing is easier than to draw texts from each which
can be cited either as an argument for absolute liberty or as an excuse for as much
repression as seems desirable at the moment."
The learned author then calls attention to Milton's argument against popery; to
Mill's assertion that "even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstanccs in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their-expression a positive instigation
to some mischievous act." He points out that "Clearly there is no escape here for
Debs or Haywood or obstructors of Liberty Loans ;" and that Mill's argument "is exactly
the one employed in sustaining the conviction of Debs." Lippman then shows how
Russell's loyalty to the unfettered development of the "creative instincts" is In marked
contrast to his advocacy of the restriction of the "possessive impulses." "Where Milton
said no 'tolerated popery,' Mr. Russell says, no tolerated 'possessive Impulses.' "
As Lippman says: "The notion of indifference is too feeble and unreal a doctrine
to protect the purpose of liberty"'* * because "It is clear that in a society where public
opinion has become decisive, nothing that counts in the formation of it can really
be a matter of indifference."
The' learned author points out that the attempts to draw fine distinctions between
"license and "liberty" is fundamentally a negative part of the day's work in that
'It consists'in trying to make opinion responsible to prevailing social standards, whereas
the really important thing is to try and make opinion increasingly responsible to facts"
by (1) protection of the sources of the news, (2) organization of the news so as to
make it comprehensible, and (3) education of human response. He concludes that
"A useful definition of liberty'is obtainable only by seeking the principlo of liberty
in the main business of human life, that is to say, in the process by which men educate
their response. and learn to control their environment. In this view liberty is the
name we give to measures by which we protect and increase the veracity of the infermotion upon which we act." LIpPMAN, LsBERTY AND N wS. Italics Ours.
2 For the purposes of this discussion the "press" shall be understood to Include
newspapers and other periodicals, books, and any other publications which are open
to public inspection.
a "Our Constitutions" shall be taken to include the Federal and the West Virginia
Constitutions, since all of the state constitutions contain essentially the same provisions
relating to freedom of the press. The only essential difference in wording Is found in
the West Virginia Constitution, as we shall see later.
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tion of this subject. It is clear that the problem is essentially the same regardless of whether it concerns "speech"
or "press."' 4 Most of the disagreement as to what will
amount to a constitutional abridgment of the liberty of' the
press occurs in connection with a consideration of restrictions imposed in abnormal times.5 Fundamental principes
and rules of interpretation, for the most part at least, are
settled. Controversies- center around their application ta

concrete cases. 6 The recent tendencies toward socializa-

tion of the law sponsored by such men as Mr. Sustirm

Holmes, 7 Judge Cardozo, a Dean Pound of Hlarvard Law
School9 and other eminent authorities, have gone far toward

rationalizing and harmonizing recent decisions involving
constitutional questions in general. As we shall see presently,

they have left their impress in this field in no small degree.
No extended comment or citation of authority is needed to,
show that any sort of "freedom" or "liberty" under our

constitutions does not mean license, but rather an exercise
of the rights- connotated by these terms. under the law.10
Nor need we pause long to convince the rnost skeptic critic-

that in order to determine with any degree of certainty
what is meant by freedom of the press under, our constitutions for the past, present or future, we must look to the

common law precedfents constitutional provisions and statutes, together with their principles of interpretation,. rela t-

ing to the common-law libels, of defamation, sedition, obscenity and blasphemy.1" The power of the courts' to punish for contempt has been invoked also against publications
calculated to imperil the integrity of the, court

In, addf-

'31 W. VA. LAW QuAn. 273.
SIdem.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905); Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S.
246, 260 (1907).
7 HOLZES "1PATa op TnE LAW," 10 HARv. L. REv. 456, 467.
a CARDOZO,NATURE op THE JUDICiAL PhocEss,

66-97.

At page' 66 the author says.

"The first cause of law is the welfare of society. The' role that misses its aim cannot.
permanently justify its existence * * *'I db not mean, of course, that judges are commissioned to set aside existing rules at pleasure- in favor of any, other' set. o rules which.
they may hold to be expedient or wise. T mean that when they are called upon to say
how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of
society, fix the path, its direction and its. distance."
POUND, SPIRIT oP THE COMMON LAw 110 and 164.
'5"
'Immunity in the mischievous use is as inconsistent with civil liberty- as prohibition of the harmless one.' " HALE, LAW OF TH Paass 274.,
1 See 5 VA. L. REv. 228, 243; 2 XiNN. L. REv. 244; 12 C. T. 952"et seq.
"We understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to
publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment for publicatibn, so
long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested by such standards as the raw'
affords. For these standards we must look to the common-Taw rules which were in
force when the constitutional guarantees were established, and in reference to which
they have been adopted." CootEy, CONSTITuTIoNAL LITATIONS. 518.
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tion to these liabilities after publication for abuses of the
liberty of the press certain previous restraints imposed directly by censorship, injunction and exclusion from second
class mailing privileges, and indirectly by advertising patronage and control of news gathering agencies, should be
mentioned.12
It is clear that the view that the First Amendment may
be ignored in times of national strife is unsound and has
been officially repudiated. 1 In direct opposition to this is
the belief of many agitators that under the constitutional
guaranty all writing is free, and only action can be restrained and punished. 4 This view is equally untenable.
Let us see what guides the experiences of the past Qffer to
assist us in maintaining that healthy medium which will insure a proper balance between the greatest possible liberty
and the general welfare which, after all, is the 'difficult question to be settled here. That there is a twilight zone wherein a delicate adjustment of its proper limits depends upon a
judicial "intuition more subtle than the most articulate
major premise" and a proper balancing of social values, is.
attested by all great present day legal thinkers. Mr.
Justice Holmes has made it clear that herein lies the key
to a proper solution of most constitutional questions.1
Long before the invention of printing it was not uncommon for governments to suppress or punish the expression of opinions calculated to disturb the existing order. In
the fifth century before Christ, Protagoras was expelled
from Athens for expressing doubt as to the existence of
Gods, and his books were burned. According to Eusebius,
the Emperor Diocletian burned the Christian Scriptures, and
in turn the Church waged a relentless war against heretical
writings. The works of the great heretic, Arius, were condemned to the flames by the Council of Nicaea, in the year
325. The Roman Church issued a list of proscribed books,
possibly as early as 494, and in the thirteenth century the
7
works of Aristotle were put under the ban.'
2

On contempt of court see HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS Ch. 5. On news-gathering

agencies, see idem, Ch. 8.
1a

On advertising see idem, Ch. 10.

CHAFEE, FREEDOM OP SPEECH 7, n. 6.
ScHoEDER, OnscENE LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CHAPE, FREEDOM or SPEECH 7, n. 6. This view is erroneous because It Is
based on a false ma5or premise by which the guaranty is given a literal Interpretation,
instead of the significance it bore to the framers. 13 CoL. L. RIv. 732, n. 2; 10 HARv. L.
REv. 456; 29 HARv. L. REv. 683.
Is 10 HARV. L. REV. 457; 29 HARV. L. REV. 683.
1T Much of this and the following history has been taken from 5 VA. L. Rav. 226;
2 MiNN. L. REv. 239; HALE, LAW OP THE PRESS, Ch. 6; 22 CASE AND COMMENT 476-7.
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But it was the invention of printing, about the middle
of the fifteenth century, that called into most intense activity the opposition to freedom of thought. From that time
to the present day governments have sought to prevent the
publication and circulation, and even the reading, of writings deemed hurtful to government, religion, or morality.
Such a course is logical where government does not rest on
the enlightened consent of the people. It is only when
government has nothing to fear from criticism that freedom
of discussion can be safely permitted. The fluctuations in
the degree of the liberty of the press in the history of the
several nations accurately reflect the course of the struggle
for liberty in general.
Several principal methods have been employed for
restricting freedom of the press. A simple method is
the prohibition of the reading of objectionable works or the
destruction of the works themselves. But the press has
been restrained chiefly by the establishment of a censorship, the punishment of authors and publishers, the limiting of the right to own, or use printing presses, and in recent times by control of news distributing agencies and by
advertising patronage.
The first index, or list of prohibited books in the modern sense, was published by Pope Paul IV, through the
Inquisition'at Rome,. in 1557. Among the books that have
been placed on the lists issued by tihe Roman Church are
the works of Galileo, Copernicus, Grotius, Gibbon, Bacon,
Milton, Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. The
Roman index was, of course, not operative in England after
the Reformation, .but many books have been burned by the
English authorities, among them early translations of the
Bible and Milton's Defensio Pro Populo Anglicano. Within
about half a century after the invention of printing, Pope
Alexander VI, in 1501, introduced the principle of the censorship by a bull against unlicensed printing. Clerical censors were established by the Roman Church in 1515.
After the Reformation the control of the press was
exercised mainly by the Crown. Printing was restrained
by the appointment of licensors, and by patents and monopolies. The.privilege was confined, in the first instance,
under regulations established by the Star Chamber in
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.Queen Mary's xeign, to members of the Stationers' Com,pany.'8
In 1581 it was made a capital offense by statute "to
write, ,print or set forth any manner of book, rhyme, ballad,
letter or writing containing any false or seditious matter
to the defamation of the Queen's Majesty, or the encourageement of insurrection within the realm."'19 Under James
I ad Charles I by the strained construction put upon this
statute by the judges, the notorious Star Chamber, under
Archbishop Laud, severely repressed all political and religious discussion. In 1637 the Star Chamber published a
,drastic ordinance against the press. In 1640 the Long
Parliament liberated prisoners condemned by the Star
Chamber. The Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 and
for a short time the press was free. During the next twenty years, to the Restoration, more than 30,000 political
pamphlets and newspapers were issued. But when the
Puritans came into power they passed an ordinance in
1643, establishing the censorship with all of its former
vigor. It was this ordinance which called forth in 1644,
Milton's famous "Areopagitica," or plea "For the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing," in the form of an address to Parliament, itself an unlicensed work. 20
tnder the Independents and the Protectorate the
press -fared somewhat better, but was not free. After the
Restoration the control Df the press was reasserted by the
government in the licensing act of 1662, which was contin*ued by successive renewals until 1679. During this period
-authors -and printers were prosecuted and works themselves were burned. 21 The licensing act was not renewed
in 1679, and from that date until the accession of James
II in -i685, there were no press laws. But by reason of
the rigid enforcement of the common law of seditious libel
the press was still held in check. The judges declared it
-to be .acrime to print anything about the government withouL a royal license. Upon the accession of James II in
1685, the licensing act was renewed and was continued
is
'2

TASWELL LANDMEAD,

ENGLISH

CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY 594.

28 Eliz., Ch. 2.
" "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, co

Truth be put in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to mlaqoubt
her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to worse, In a
free and open encounter? * * * Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue
freely according to conscience, above all liberties." MILTON, AnEOPAOITXOA.
'

Supra, n.

18.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss1/3

6

Michael: Freedom of the Press Under Our Constitution
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONS

35

in force until it finally expired in 1695.22 The Commons
refused to renew it in 1695, and from that date there has
been no press censorship in England. However the people
at large were slow to recognize that freedom of the press
was the foundation of all their liberties. Even during the
Revolution of 1688, that brought an end to the tyranny of
the Stuarts and established a new succession based upon
the consent of the people, the importance of securing the
freedom of the press was not yet understood. Here and
there has risen some champion of the freedom of the press,
such as Milton, Erskine or Alexander Hamilton,2 but in
the long history of the emancipation of the press the people have played a very small part.
The passing of the censorship was followed, in the
reign of Queen Anne, by the rapid development, in dignity
and political and literary importance, of the periodical
press. Newspapers multiplied and such writers as Addison, Steele, Swift, and Defoe entered the field of journalism. From 1712 to 1855 a heavy tax was laid upon periodicals and proved effective as a check upon the press.
But the most powerful instrument employed by the
government during the eighteenth century for the suppression of freedom of the press was the law of libel. It was
in some of the most famous of these trials during the reign
of George H that the ability and eloquence of Thomas Erskine were enlisted in behalf of the rights of juries in libel
cases. Though the judges decided against him, among
them Lord Mansfield, in 1792 the principles for which
he contended were embodied in the famous Fox's Libel
Act. 24 This statute took the power to control the press
from the government and gave it to the jury. They were
allowed to render a general verdict covering the law and
facts. As Mr. Dicey has said, "Freedom of discussion is in
England little else than the right to write or say anything
which a jury consisting of twelve shopkeepers think it expedient should be said or written."25 Provisions embody22 MACAULEY, 3 HISTORY OF ENGLAND 374. It is usually stated that the act expired
in 1694.

=

See VEEDEa, LEGAL MJAsTEREiPcEs.

u

BuCm,

U

DicEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

811.

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 349; GREEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE
(4th ed.)

235.
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ing the principles of this act 26have been inserted in our
federal and state constitutions.
. It is interesting to notice at this time that some of
our most eloquent champions of the right of free discussion
were careful to make it clear that there were some classes
of people who should not be entitled to exercise this right.
Thus Milton in his famous essay, "Areopagitica," would exclude the papists; and Erskine would exclude the religious
heretics. 27 This privilege was not a part of the English
constitution, no mention being made of it in the Petition of
Right (1628), or the Bill of Rights (1689), two great constitutional documents that are the direct forerunners of our
own Bill of Rights. In fact until comparatively recent
times, the right of public discussion so far from being free,
was very narrowly restricted.
The English settlement of America took place at a
time when the prosecution of the press in England was at
its height, and in the American colonies, from the beginning,
the English and local governments restricted the liberty of
the press. The first printing press was set up in Massachusetts in 1639 but was little used until 1849, when the
magistrates were compelled by public opinion, to permit
the publication of the laws. 28 In 1662 the general Court
of Massachusetts appointed two licensors ani prohibited
the publication of anything not approved by them. We
find Governor Berkeley of Virginia, in 1671, thanking God
"there are no free schools or printing."" The prohibition
of all printing except by license -was in full forge in Virginia, Massachusetts and New York. In fact the requirement of a previous license for publication persisted in
Massachusetts for more than a score of years longer than in
England, having been abolished only in 1719.0 The King
on being notified of the arrest of the unlicensed publisher
of the Virginia laws in 1682 forbade the further publication
of such laws."' He instructed the next governor in 1684,
that no one should use a printing press in Virginia. From
1683 to 1729 no printing was allowed in Virginia, and from
" See the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, amendments V and VII; CONSTITUTION OF WEST VIRGINIA, Art. II, §10.
70 CENT. L. J. 189.
IS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS (7th ed.)
601.
" 2 WATSON, CONSTITUTION 1400.
90 4 HARV. L. REv. 379.
1 1 HILDRETH, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATFS 561.

=
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1729 to about 1765 there was only one press in the colony
and this was largely controlled by the governor. The first
newspaper in Virginia, the "Virginia Gazette," was established in 1736. The first newspaper published in America
by Benjamin Harris, entitled "Public Occurrences Foreign
and Domestick," in Boston, 1690, was suppressed after the
first issue. The first printer in Pennsylvania was William
Bradford, who is noteworthy also as perhaps the first champion of the freedom of the press in the New World. In
169i he was arrested for seditious libel, tried in 1692, and
conducted his own defense, arguing with power that the
jury should be the judge not only of the fact of printing
but also as to the character of the publication as libellous
or otherwise, thus anticipating the memorable contention
of Erskine by one hundred years. The jury disagreed but
Bradford was released and moved to New York where he
set up the first printing press in the province and served as
royal printer for fifty years.
But the emancipation of the press in the colonies was
near at hand. In 1735 one Zengler was prosecuted in New
York, at the instance of the governor for seditious libel.
Andrew Hamilton, a noted, Philadelphia lawyer, who defended him offered to prove the truth of the charge printed,
but the court refused to admit the evidence. Thereupon
Hamilton boldly turnd to the jury and said:
"We appeal to you for witnesses of the facts. The
jury have the right to determine both the law and the
fact and they ought to do so. The question before you
is not the cause of a poor printer, nor of New York alone;
it is the cause of liberty, the liberty of opposing arbitrary
power by speaking and writing the truth."
32
The jury brought in a verdict of not guilty.
This was the last serious attempt, in the colonies, to
curb the press, which later became a powerful influence in
promoting the Revolution and the adoption of the constitution. It was declared in the Virginia Bill of Rights of
1776 that "the freedom of the press is one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, that can never be restrained but by
despotic governments." Similar provisions were inserted
in the first constitutions of other states. But in the Federal
2

Great American Lawyers: Sketch of Andrew Hamilton.
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Constitutional Convention a proposal to insert in the Consti-

tution a declaration that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved," was rejected on the ground that it was
unnecessary because the power of Congress does not extend
to the press. The omission was supplied however by the
First Amendment, which provides among other things,
that "Congress shall make no law * * * abridging freedom

of speech or the press."
After this the Alien and Sedition acts were passed
during the excitement of the impending war with France
in 1798. These statutes were aimed especially at the
large number of foreigners who were then actively opposing
the government. There were no prosecutions under the
Alien Act, but there were a number under the Sedition Act. 3
The statute was challenged as void under the first amendment but was sustained by the trial court, the cases nevwr
reaching the supreme court. The statute is mild enough
and would now almost certainly be sustained; but it was
then against the temper of the times. The two statutes
called forth the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, and
would undoubtedly have been repealed but they soon expired by their own terms, the Alien Act in 1800, and the
Sedition Act in 1801.33.
The last prosecution for political libel in this country
occurred in 1804. One Henry Croswell published a libel
on Jefferson. The trial court refused to. allow him to
prove the truth of the charge and charged the jury that
they were to find only the facts and not the general question of guilt. The case was taken to the Supr6me Court of
the state, where Alexander Hamilton appeared for the defendant. The Supreme Court was equally divided in opinion, and the case went against the defendant, but shortly
afterwards the state legislature passed a statute embodying the principles contended for by Hamilton, that the truth
3Reports of the trials of Lyon, Cooper, Haswell and Callender, under the'Scditron
Act, will be found under the appropriate titles in Federal Cases; and In Wharton's
State Trials at pp. 333-659-684 and 688 respectively.
God eternal hostility against every form of
"a "I have sworn upon the altar of
tyranny against the mind of man."-Thomas Jefferson.
Jefferson's first official act after becoming president was to pardon all offenders
and remit all fines imposed under the Sedition Act of 1708. HALE, LAW OF TUE PRSS
282. n. 12.
337 (1804). In this case Hamilton gave a
'4 People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. (N. Y.)
definition of the law of libel which was adopted by Chancellor Kent as comprehensive
and accurate and has since been repeated by hundreds of writers and Judges, that Is,
"the liberty of the pre8s consists in the right to publish, writh imnpunity truth, with
good iotives, and for justifiable ends, whether it reapects government, magistrao or
individuals." Italics ours.
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may be offered in evidence and that the jury are the
judges of both law and facts, and the defendant was given
a new trial. The truth may be pleaded in justification in
West Virginia.8 5
There is little to record concerning seditious libel or
any other aspects of the development of the freedom
of the press from 1804 to 1917, as the government paid
little attention to the vituperative attacks of the press and
pamphleteers until the passage of the so-called Espionage
Act of 1917, and the noteworthy Seditious Libel Amendment thereto in 1918. 36 This brings us to a consideration
of the meaning of liberty of the press under our constitutions as defined by our legislatures, courts, and juries today.
"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging freedom
of speech or of the press." 37 "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty.

38

Other state constitutions

provisions.3 9

The only substantial variacontain similar
tion in wording is found in the West Virginia Constitution
which provides:
"No law abridging freedom of speech or of the
press, shall be passed; but the legislature may by suitable
penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene
books, papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of character, and for the
of suitrecovery in civil actions, by the aggrieved party,
' 40
able damages for such libel or defamation.

Although the Federal Constitution does not specifically
provide that every person shall be responsible for the abuse
of the liberty granted, it "has invariably been subjected
to a limitation similar to that expressed in the state Constitutions." 4'
How far do these constitutional guaranties leave the
press unfettered? Clearly the individual is entitled to the
largest measure of liberty of utterance that is consistent
'WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION,

Art. III, §2.

H HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS 283.
ETU. S. CONSTITUTION, Amendment I.

Z3 CONSTITUTION OF ILLINOIS, Art. I1, §4.

n For a detailed .analysis and summary of the provisions in the various states see
STILISON, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 144-145.
§7.
*3 CONSTITUTION OF WEST VIRGINIA, Art. I1,
41 HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS 273.
The author in discussing this subject says:
"The effect of these provisions is to render any statute passed in conflict therewith

void ; the provision of the Federal Constitution applying only to acts of Congress and
the state constitutional provisions to acts of the states."
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with the well-being of society as a whol'e.42 When the individual passes beyond that line liberty becomes license and
48
abuse.
The writer believes that it is a safe conclusion that
the amount of liberty which the press enjoys depends on
public opinion. Over a century before, Hamilton realized
this when he wrote:
"What is the liberty of the press? Who can give
it any definition that would not leave the utmost latitude
for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this
I infer that its security, whatever fine declarations may
be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit
of the people and the governments. And here, after all,
* * * * must we seek for the only solid basis of all our
rights.""
Blackstone defined freedom of the press as consisting
"In laying no previous restraint upon publications,
and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter
'45
when published.
However, this generalization has been shown to be too
broad in that it fails to provide for the use of the injunction
in certain cases: as where the act of publication results in
intimidation and coercion, and is treated as crime, or where
there is a publication in aid of a boycott. It is unsound for
the further reason that it illogically ignores freedom of
speech, partner in the guaranty with liberty of the press.
Nor does it account for modern censorship. Neither is it
involved in that large class of cases holding that statutes
prohibiting publications which affect injuriously the public welfare, do not invade the constitutional right of freedom of the press. 46 The unsoundness of this definition will
2

HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS 274.

' Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. & AId. 95, 132 (1820).
The court said: "Where vituperation begins, the liberty of the press ends. * * * * The liberty of the press allows us to
persuade men to use their constitutional influence over their representatives to obtain,
in the regular parliamentary manner, a redress of real or supposed grievances. But this
must be done with temper or moderation, otherwise instead of setting the government
in motion for the people, the people may be set in motion against the government."
44

Italics ours.

"Similarly, Treitschke, looking at the subject from the standpoint of government,
after examining possible modes of state control of the press, observes, 'We must, unfortunately, come to the conclusion that in a free state a better appreciation of moral
values on the part of the public is the only way in which an unworthy press can be
made to reap the contempt which it deserves.' " 5 VA.L. REv. 244-5.
" 4

BLACKSTONE'S

COMBIENTAIES,

2 MINN. L. REv. 251.

151.

Examples of such statutes declared to be valid are: Those

penalizing utterances or publications tending to encourage commission of crimes.

People

V. Mlost, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902). Those designed to prevent or hinder enlistment in the military forces of the United States or of the state. United States v.
Pierce, 245 Fed. 878 (1817) ; State v. Holm, 189 Minn. 267, 166 N. W. 181 (1918).
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be considered further in connection with a discussion of
the use of the injunction and modern censorship as restraints
on the liberty of the press.
It is submitted that the court in People v. Most47 by a
negative process gave about as accurate an interpretation of
the meaning of liberty of the press as the nature of the
subject will admit, when it said:
"It [the liberty of the press] does not deprive the
state of the primary right of self-preservation. It does
not sanction unbridled license, nor authorize the publication of articles prompting the commission of murder or
the overthrow of government by force. All courts and
commentators contrast the liberty of the press with its
licentiousness, and condemn as not sanctioned by the
constitution of any state, appeals, designed to destroy the
reputation of the citizen, the
peace of society or the ex47a
istence of the government.'
The court in Coleman v. McLennan,48 was not far wrong
when it said:
" 'Liberty of the press' is still an undefined term,
and, like some other familiar phrases of constitutional
law, must remain undefined. Certain boundaries are
fairly discernible within which liberty must [may] be
displayed, but precise rules cannot be formulated in advance to govern its exercise on particular occasions. In
the decision of controversies, the character, the organization, the needs and the will of society at the present
time must be given due consideration."
It is submitted that the view presented here shows a proper
legal conception of some of the more important considerations which should enter into any interpretation of constitutional liberty of the press. 49
It is a safe conclusion that most of the authorities
quoted from above agree that most restrictions on the liberty (or perhaps we should say the abuse of the liberty)
,7Supra, n, 46.
,3 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).

- Paterson said: "The liberty of the press means the liberty of publishing whatever
any member of the public thinks fit on any subject, without any preliminary license or
qualification whatsoever, and subject only to this restriction: 'That if he goes to an
extreme in making blasphemous, immoral, seditious or defamatory. statements, then he
nay be Punished afterwards by indictment, information, or by action for such excess."
PATERSON,

LIsEIRTY OF PRESS, SPEECH

AND WORSHIP

38. To

substantially

the same

effect see STORY'S COIMMENTARIE5 ON THE CONSTITUTION §1874. These interpretations, apparently, are open to the same criticism which was made of Blackstone's definition, in that they imply that liberty of the press within the meaning of the First Amendment prohibits all previous restraints. It is submitted that freedom of the press under
our constitutions does not and never was intended to include liberty of publication
"without any qualification whatsoever." Italics ours.
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of the press are to be found in the present definition and punishment of the common law crimes of blasphemous, obscene, defamatory and seditious libel. 0 When we add to
this a consideration of the legal meaning and scope of privilege, fair comment, contempt proceedings, the use of the
injunction, certain species of quasi-censorship (including
the exclusion of publications from second class mailing
privileges and censorship of the movies) and divers indirect
methods of controlling the press, it is submitted that the
nature of the subject will not admit of a much more accurate delineation or conception of the scope of the freedom
of the press which we enjoy under our constitutions. Therefore your attention is now directed to this vital phase of the
problem.
The limits of this discussion will prevent anything more
than a consideration in a general way, of the meaning and
present legal status of the above mentioned factors. While
it is understood that the common law principles which
touch and concern many of these matters, for the most part
at least, are settled and familiar to the average lawyer, it
is assumed that a brief sketch covering the more fundamental of them with reference to pertinent constitutional
and statutory provisions, and the interpretations placed
upon them, will be of sufficient assistance to a better understanding of our problem to justify a brief digression for
that purpose.
In the case of Regina v. Ramsey and Foote,5 1 Lord Coleridge adopts Mr. Starkie's statement of the law of blaspiemous libel, the vital part of which reads as follows:
"A wilful intention to pervert, insult, and mislead
others, by means of licentious and contumelious abuse
applied to sacred subjects, or by wilful misrepresentations or artful sophistry, calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary,, is the criterion and test of guilt. A
malicious and mischievious intention in law, as well as
morals-a state of apathy and indifference to the interests of society, is the broad boundary between right and
wrong."
In the same opinion Lord Coleridge says:
"If the law as I have laid it down to you is correct
-if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the
HALE, THE LAw OF THE PRESS 274; 2 MINN. L. REv. 250-251.
51 16 Cox C. C. 23 (1888).
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fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel. There are many
great and grave writers, who have attaeked the foundations of Christianity. Mr. Mill undoubtedly did so; but
no one can read their writings without seeing the difference between them and the incriminated publications,
which I am obliged to say is a difference not of degree
but of kind. There is a grave, an earnest, a reverent, I
am almost tempted to say, a religious tone in the attacks
on Christianity itself, which show that what is aimed at
is not insult to the opinions of the majority of Christians,
but a real, quiet, honest pursuit of truth. * * * * With regard to many of these persons therefore, I should say that
they were within the protection of the law. * * * * I think
it * * * a good law that persons should be obliged to respect the opinions of those amongst whom they live."
It is believed that this statement of the law of blaphemous
libel embodies a proper position with regard to it, in that
it points out the true boundaries between an honest search
for the truth of religion within the law, and a destructive
attitude of ridicule, contempt and scorn toward those sacred beliefs which form some of the strongest safeguards
of the welfare of society, and which the law (always a
jealous mistress) protects from the evil incident, in this
field of law, to an unwarranted abuse of liberty. Cooley
agrees with this view. 52 The West Virginia Constitution
seems to be in accord with the position taken above by
providing that:
"All men shall be free to profess, and by argument,
to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and the
same shall, in no wise, affect, diminish or enlarge their
civil capacities."531
It should be noted in passing that it seems to be admitted
that blasphemy was punishable at common law principally because it tended directly to a breach of the peace. 54
Here again public opinion will decide when discussion concerning religion must, in the interest of the general welfare,
'2 Cooley says: "Blasphemy implies something more than a denial of any of the
truths of religion, even of the highest and most vital. A bad motive must exist; there
must be a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence for the Deity, or for
the accepted religion. A malicious and mischievous intention is * * * * the broad
boundary between right and wrong * * !* * Legal blasphemy implies that the words were

uttered in a wanton manner, 'with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a
serious discussion upon any controverted point in religion.' "

Coormy, CoNsTrroOAL

LIMrrAoNs, 670-3 and authorities cited.
03 CONST=TION OF WEST VmINA, Art III, §15.
0' See 8 C. J. 1119 and authorities cited.
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be held to fall outside of the protection of the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of the press.
The publication of obscene and indecent writings is
made criminal by both common and statute law. 55 State
statutes generally condemn them and an act of congress
renders them non-mailable. 6 The West Virginia Constitution provides that "the legislature may by suitable penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene books, pap ers or pictures."'5 7 Under this provision the West Virginia
Legislature enacted the following statute:
"If a person import, print, publish, sell or distribute
any book or other thing containing obscene language, or
any print, picture, figure or description manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth, or introduce it into
any family or place of education, he shall be confined in
jail not more than one year and fined not to exceeding
two hundred dollars."' 8
It will be observed that this is a sweeping statute and
would sustain almost any sort of prosecution initiated
within its scope if it is not properly construed and limited
by our courts in conformity to the spirit and purposes of
the fundamental law.
Federal statutes59 have been construed to make the
mailing of obscene letters, though sealed, unlawful. 0 These
statutes are not an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech or of the press. 61 The same is true of the mailing
of lottery circulars. 2 As the court in United States v.
Harmon has tersely said, "the aggregate sense of the community" must determine the propriety of any legislation on
this subject s The necessity and reasonableness of legisla55 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (1770) ; Rex v. Curl, 7 Strange 788 (1727).
90 HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS, 293.
07 CONSTIUTION OP WEST VIRGINIA, Art. III, §8.
' BARNES' W. VA. CODE, 1928, Ch. 149, §11.
59U. S. REV. STATUTES §3893 (1888).
"United States v. Gaylord, 50 Fed. 410 (1883); United States v. Martin, 50 Fed.
918 (1892) ; United States v. Andrews, 58 Fed. 861 (1893).
61 United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (1891); Harman v. United States, 50 Fed.
921 (1892).
C In
re Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877 (1877). It is generally held that the
question of obscenity in a particular publication is for the jury and not for the court.
U. S. v. Bennett, 16 Blatchf. 388 (1879) ; U. S. v. Clark, 38 Fed. 500 (1899) ; People v.
Muller, 96 N. Y. 408 (1884). Where the publication is manifestly obscene the defendants motive in publishing it is immaterial. U. S. v. Harmon, supra; U. S. v. Bennett,
supra. But the purpose for which a book is published may have a bearing upon the
question whether or not it is indecent, as for example, books published for scientific
and medical purposes, which would be indecent and obscene for purposes of general
circulation. U. S. v. Harmon, supra; U. S. v. Clark, supra.
It has been suggested that if the existing test prevents the publication of writings
of educational value, the remedy is open through the legislature, for the Constitution
only prevents restrictions upon, and not enlargements of, the rights to publish.
3United
States v. Harmon, supra.
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tion against obscene publications is well stated by the court,
in this case, in the following language:
"To the pure all things are pure is too poetical for
the actualities of practical life. There is in the popular
conception and heart such a thing as modesty * * * * *
It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and
Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge they passed
from that condition of perfectibility which some people
nowadays aspire to, and their eyes being opened,, they
discerned that there was both good and evil; 'and they
knew they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.' From that day to
this civilized man has carried with him the sense of shame,
* * * the feeling that were some things on which the
eye-the mind should not look * * * and where men and
women became so depraved by the use, or so insensate
by perverted education, that they will not veil their
eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government should perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the body politic."
While overzealous or overnice people may attempt
undue interference with publications which are not condemned by people of average sentiment and thus discredit
the law in popular estimation, and on the other hand people of coarse mind or impure character may condemn the
law as an unwarrantable interference, the "aggregate
sense of the community" must determine what is obscene
or indecent in the same way that it is in the final event the
test of all questions of reasonableness or propriety.
There is no doubt that the tendency of the press of
this country is to publish sensational and often false accounts of indivdual wrongs and immoralities, and even
while deprecating this, urge that competitive necessity requires that they give the public these things because it
wants them. Unless we are going to allow the commercial
idea to pander to the immoral, these publications should be
suppressed under the general police power of the state,"
because the slight social value which they have in the exposition of ideas and as a step toward the truth is clearly outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear
and see. 65 The jury may be said to generally fairly repre58 CENT. L. J. 884.

' CHAFEE, FREEOM

oF SPEoH 170.
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sent "the aggregate sense of the community." So we may
safely commission them under the direction of the court
to draw the line where decency ends and obscenity begins.
Civil libel or defamation is not protected by the constitutional guaranty of a free press. 6 According to the
generally accepted definition defamation consists in a malicious writing or printing, brought to the notice of a third
person, which tends either to blacken the memory of one
who is dead or the reputation of one who is alive and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, either by
(1) imputing to him the commission of a crime, (2) tending. to injure him in his office, profession, calling or trade,
or (3) by holding him up to scorn, ridicule or contempt
whereby he is impaired in the enjoyment of general
society.67 Thus it is defamation to charge a man with being a thief, to charge an attorney with "sharp practice,"
to charge an official with graft, and to charge a woman
with incontinency; but it is not defamation to charge a
candidate for office with impoliteness or lack of party principles, or to use the portrait and name of a person to advertise a patent medicine. However this last situation has
given rise to much discussion under the so-called right of
privacy. The Georgia court allowed recovery in a similar
case, but the majority of courts hold otherwise."'
Defamation is a criminal as well as a civil wrong.
Apart from rules as to publication, criminal libel differs
from civil libel only in that the latter is confined to the
defamation of a living person, whereas criminal libel includes a deceased person as well. The reason for this
distinction is that the objective in civil libel is the award of
damages as compensation to the injured person, while the
law of criminal libel is concerned with- the preservation of
tihe peace.69
The courts have revised Hamilton's definition of the
liberty of the press in the ordinary law of libel as stated
in the Croswell Case, so as to read-"liberty of the press
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LiImzzATzOis 604; Sweeney V. Baker. 13 W. Va. 182
See also 32 L. 1L A. 88r.
7 NEWEL, SLANDER AND LIBE.
67. Observe that this definition includes both criminal and civil defamation.
0 4 N. CAR. L: REv. 27; Pavesick v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101 (1905) ; 4 HARy. L. REv. 193.
13 Thus within recent years it was held that a scurrilous attack on the charaoter
of George Washington was a criminal libel. State v. Haffer, 94; Wash. 136, 162 Pao.
45 (1917).
¢'

(1878).
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and freedom of speech is a privilege to publish with impunity a falsehood on matters of public concern in the
honest belief that it is a true statement with good motives
for justifiable ends." So we see that at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution liberty of speech and the press
meant the right to publish, with impunity, truth on matters
of public concern without more, and that under the revised
form its meaning has been greatly extended. The Constitution of West Virginia provides for the punishment of defamatory libel, and the recovery of suitable damages in
civil actions.70 The truth, published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, is a complete defense in prosecutions
and civil suits for libel in West Virginia.'
Under certain circumstances privilege and the right to
comment furnish justification for defamatory utterances.
Privilege is of two kinds, absolute and conditional. Judges,
counsel, members of state legislatures and of Congress,
while in the discharge of their duties are granted absolute
immunity for all defamatory utterances, on the ground that
it is considered sound public policy to send such individuals
upon such occasions to their tasks, unhampered by any
lurking fear that they iater may be called to account for
what they say. Reports of legislative, judicial and other
public proceedings are conditionally privileged. They are
allowed so long as they are fair, true and free from malice.72 Speaking of conditional privilege in reference to
judicial proceedings, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"It is desirable that the trial of causes should take
place under the public eye, not because the controversies
of one citizen with another are of public concern, but
because it is of the highest moment that those who
administer justice should always act under the sense of
public responsibility and that every citizen should be
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode
in which a public duty is performed." 78
Matters of public concern are the legitimate subject of
fair and honest comment and criticism. The criticism must
TO
CoNsT

oN oF WEST VmGIm,
Art. 31L §7.
71CONSTIrUTION OF WEST V1RrNIA, Art. III, §8. It is worthy of notice that we
have a statute in West Virginia making insulting words actionable as a breach of
peace. BARNES' W. VA. CODE, 1928, c. 103, §2.
2 Ha,
LAW OF THE PRESS 90-91; 4 N. CAR. L. RE-V.30; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LMTATIONS 629 et. ecq.
71 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 M[ass. 392 (1884).
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relate to a matter of public concern, such as books offered
to the public and plays publicly performed, and not to a
matter which is purely private. The criticism must be the
honest opinion of the critic and not prompted by personal
malice. It must be directed against the public work, performance or conduct and not against the individual as 'such.
It is comment or expression of opinion, and not misstatement of fact, that is permitted. It is submitted that the
following statement of the reasons for the rule, by Mr.
Hale, are sound:
"'The actor, the artist and the author submit their
professional work to the public, and thereby appeal to
the public for support and approval.' Having made this
appeal to the public, the person cannot complain that
the public proceeds to pass judgment, so long, at least,
as it is honest and fair. Moreover a good critic is a public benefactor. The services that he is able to render
justify according to him some privileges and immunities.
'The critic does a great service to the public, who writes
down any vapid or useless publication, such as ought never to have appeared. He checks the dissemination of
bad taste, and prevents the people from wasting their
time on trash.' "
Comment must be distinguished from the reports of judicial proceedings, since the former is not privileged. 5
Sometimes comment may degenerate into contempt of
court, and as such, not being within the protection of the
constitutional guaranty, it is another limitation on the freedom of the press. Bishop says that:
"According to the general doctrine, any publication,
whether by parties or strangers, which concerns a case
pending in court, and has a tendency to prejudice the
public concerning its merits, and to corrupt the administration of justice, or which reflects on the tribunal or its
proceedings, or on the parties, the jurors, the witnesses,
or the counsel, may be visited as a contempt." 70
Contempt may be direct, that is, such as is committed in
the presence of the court, or indirect, that is, such as is not
committed in the presence of the court and in the latter instance the offender must be brought in by process. The
,HAT,
LAW OF THE PREsS 130-131.
Brown v. Providence Telegram Pub. Co., 25 R. 1. 117, 54 Atl. 1051 (1908).
70 BrSHoP, CRIMINAL LAW §216. See also People v. Wilson ct ca.,64 Il1. 105
(1372), where the rule is laid down that publications are a contempt when they are
calculated to. impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
"
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court may punish both forms by summary proceedings.7 7 In
Haskell v. Faulds, the court held that while anyone has the
right to comment on judicial decisions and the fitness of the
judges who render them, if he attempts, by defamatory publications, to degrade judicial tribunals, he is guilty of an abuse
of the liberty of the press. 7 It is submitted that the court in
this case has accurately defined the limits of the power of the
courts to punish for contempt.
In another connection it was intimated that Blackstone's theory that freedom of the press meant freedom
from all previous restraints was not tenable. In no place
is this more clearly shown than in the use the courts have
made of the injunction in granting equitable relief against
defamation and injuries to personality. 9 There is authority for the position that the common law theory was that
equity would not interfere to enjoin a threatened publication of a libellous nature. 0 It has been shown that this
refusal has been based upon one or more of three grounds.
First, equity protects property interests only, not interests
of personality. Second, it would be a denial of the right
of trial by jury. Third, it would be a species of previous
restraint, prohibited by the Blackstonian theory.8 1
However the courts have been far from consistent in
their adherence to this theory, and in their reasons for sz,
doing. In Br'andreth v. Lance, the threatened publication
being clearly a libel on the plaintiff and an injury to personality only, the court sustained a demurrer to the bill,
applying the Blackstonian theory and the doctrine that
equity does not protect interests of personality. Dean
Pound shows that of the three doctrines as to the scope of
liberty of publication advanced by Blackstone, Story and
7T COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIrATONS, 453, n. 2.
73 Haskell v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 85 (1895). Quoting with approval from
another decision, the court in the Haskell Case said: "Any citizen has the right to
publish the proceedings and decisions of this court; and, if he deem it necessary for the
public good, to comment upon them freely, discuss their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them; but he has no right to attempt, by defamatory
publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it, and dispose the
community to 'disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments, and decrees. Such
publications are an abuse of the liberty of the press, and tend to sap the very foundation of good order and well-being in society, by obstructing the course of justice. If
a judge is really corrupt and unworthy the station which he holds, the Constitution
has provided an ample remedy, by impeachment or address, where he can meet his
accuser face to face, and his conduct may undergo a full investigation."
7 See the admirable treatment of this subject by Dean Pound of Harvard Law
School in 29 HARv. L. REV. 640; 28 HARv. L. Rav. 343, 854, and 859.
60 Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 24 (1839).
s' 29 HARV. L. Rv. 648 et #eq.
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Cooley, only Blackstone's would justify the position taken
in Brandreth v. Lance, and that it is unsound for if all penalty
may be imposed upon the publisher after the act, its effect
will be to impose an indirect censorship and evade the
guarantee. He says:
"Blackstone's doctrine has usually been criticized as
not going far enough in securing against imposition of
liability after publication upon arbitrary and unreasonable grounds. Equally it goes too far in denying to the
law all power of restraint before publication. Although
its best title to consideration is in the history of the subject, it goes beyond what history indicates as the main
purpose, namely, a freedom from a regime of general
censorship and license of printing."
The United States Supreme Court announced Blackstone's
doctrine in Patterson v. Colorado.2 But the same court
upheld previous restraint upon publication when incidental to enjoining an unlawful boycott.8 This is a good
example of the class of decisions which allow an injunction
where the writing or publication is part of a wrong which
would be enjoined of itself. In other words Blackstone's
view as to liberty of publication is not tenable here as the
ground of denying relief and the main argument in Brandreth v. Lance is put out of the way.
Dean Pound approves of three classes of cases wherein
equity in truth secures personality, although purporting to
secure substance only. First, there are cases of publication in violation of contract or of trust. Here the theory is
that the beneficial interest in. the trust res or contract right
is an asset to be protected. But in. reality the substantial
interest secured is generally one of personality. Second,
there are cases involving private letters. Here relief is
granted to protect against invasion of privacy since -the
property interest involved is practically a fiction. Third,
there are the cases of wrongful expulsion from social clubs
where the real wrong complained of is the humiliation and
injury to feelings. There is also a group of related cases
where the jurisdiction of equity has been invoked to protect an individual interest in a domestic relation; as where
the defendant assumed the plaintiff's name and lived with
- 205 U. S. 455, 462 (1907).
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S.'418, 48T (1911).
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the latter's husband;84 and in the case where the mother
of a child born in adultery was enjoined from claiming for
the child the status of a lawfully begotten child of the
plaintiff.85 Thus we see equity does protect interests of
personality.
Even though it is admitted that there is a clear policy
in favor of jury trial of an issue of truth in a charge of
defamation, where it is admitted that the publication is
false, or where the falsity is so clear that there is really
nothing for a jury to try, the policy in question should not
stand is the way of an injunction. The English case of
Dixon v. Holden 86 seemingly sustaining jurisdiction in
equity in such cases as these, represents the present trend
of American authority, although the cases of Boston and
Diatite Company v. Florence Mfg. Company, 7 and Prudential
Assurance Company v. Knott,s8 holding the contrary view,
have exercised a controlling influence in the United States in
the past. As Dean Pound says:
"In England now this subject has the very same
development as equity jurisdiction over trespass, over
disturbance of easements, and over nuisance. American
courts are moving in the same direction, reaching such
cases indirectly by laying hold of some admitted head
of equity jurisdiction and tacking thereto what is in substance a concurrent jurisdiction over legal injuries
through publication * * * * At any rate so long as denial
of relief in such cases rests on no stronger basis than
authority our courts will find a way out."89
It is suggested that these injunction cases well illustrate the unfortunate consequences of the application of the
Blackstone theory. It would seem more reasonable to say
that constitutional freedom of the press prohibits any other
previous restraints than those that are necessary to the public welfare, thus leaving the courts free to exercise their
equity powers in accordance with settled principles of
justice.90
Though it is true, as we have seen, that when equity, in
so-called exceptional cases, enjoins the issuance of a publis'Hodecker v. Stricker, 89 N. Y. S. 515 (1896).
E3Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. T. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907).
81 7 Eq. 488 (1889).
" 114 Mass. 69 (1873).
c' 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875).
83 29 HARV. L. REV. 662 et 8eq.
goSee 2 MINN. L. REv. 253-255.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1926

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1926], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW" QUARTERLY

cation, there is some other element which gives jurisdiction, such as the menace of intimidation or crime, the fact
remains that the First Amendment has to give way to allow
previous restraints. What then becomes of the Blackstonian theory? The fact that a few early Federalist
judges, due to their slavish adherence to English authorities held to this theory, should have little weight. Although Justice Holmes carried it into the Supreme Court in
Patterson v. Colorado, he has since repudiated it in the
Schenck and Abrams Cases.
Professor Chafee's observations on this theory are conclusive. He says:
"This Blackstonian theory dies hard, but it ought to
be knocked on the head once for all. In the first place,
Blackstone was not interpreting a constitution, but trying to state the English law of'his time, which had no censorship and did have extensive libel prosecutions.
Whether or not he did state that law correctly an entirely
different view of the liberty of the press was soon afterwards enacted in Fox's Libel Act, so that Blackstone's
view does not even correspond to the English law of the
last hundred and twenty-five years." 91
When we add to this the fact that this theory is inconsistent
with the very nature of our elective, limited and responsible
government as opposed to the dominantly hereditary government of Great Britain, we see why this view of the liberty of the press never has been really adopted in this
country. 92 It is submitted that history, precedents and
vital considerations of public policy are inconsistent with
the notion that liberty of publication under our constitutions
includes freedom from all previous restraints, even though
it be conceded that the First Amendment was meant by
its framers to ensure that which had already become the
law, namely, that no preliminary license requirement should
be imposed before publication. It will be observed that
this vital difference between the removal of preliminary
license requirements and removal of all restraints is the
principal point of disagreement among commentators,
writers and judges who discuss the Blackstonian theory and
interpretations of the First Amendment.
9%CHAFEE,

FREEDOM OF SPEECn 9.
12 See 18 MiCH. L. REV. 685.
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The question as to whether the constitutional guaranties
of a free press should be extended to give the motion
picture industry protection against censorship does not
seem to have given the courts much trouble. A series of
cases decided that the constitutional guarantees did not
extend to give protection against interference with the exhibition of the productions of this industry.98 In these
cases it was insisted that motion picture films were a part
of the press, and that as no law could be passed to restrain
the liberty of the press, no law could be passed to subject
motion pictures to censorship before their public exhibition.
In Mutual Film Company v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, the

court said:
"The first impulse of the mind is to reject the contention. We immediately feel that the argument is
wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free
opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are
advertised on the billboards of our cities and towns, and
which regards them as emblems of public safety, * * * and

which seeks to bring motion pictures and other spectacles
into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion. The judicial sense supporting the com-

mon sense of the country is against the contention. * * *

It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition oT moving,
pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we think, as a part of the press of the country or
as organs of public opinion. They are mere representatives of events, of ideas and sentiments, published and
known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but, as
we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the
greater because of their attractiveness and manner of
exhibition."
A censorship, then, reasonably related to the exhibition
of films within a state, is within the police power of a State,
and a statute so providing does not abridge our federal or
state constitutional provisions sefeguarding the freedom of
the press. 94
Another limitation on the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of the press is the exclusion of 5rinted matter
13 iutual Film Co. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (1915) ; Mutual Film Co. V. Industrial
Comm. of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230 (1915) ; Mutual Film Co. v. Hodge. Goy. of Kansas. 236
U. S. 248 (1916).

942 VA..L. REv. 216, 218; 9 ILL. L. REv. 130.
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from the mails by the postal authorities under governmental sanction. The United States Supreme Court has decided that this does not amount to an abridgment of the
liberty of the press under our constitutions. " It has been
held that a newspaper which carries advertising of a selling
scheme, advertising or trade extension campaign, which violates the lottery laws may be excluded from the mails by
the Post Office Department. 8 A federal statute makes
obscene literature non-mailable. 97 The object of Congress
in excluding these and various other articles from the mails,
has not been to interfere with the liberty of the press, but
to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed
8
injurious to the public morals.
Under the Espionage Act, in the case of Masses Publishing Company v. Patten,9 Judge Hand granted an injunction to restrain the Postmaster of New York from
denying second class privilege to The Masses. But the
upper court reversed the decision on the ground that the
publication was intended to interfere with the successful
prosecution of the war. 100 Later the United States Supreme
Court upheld the administrative action of Postmaster General Burleson in revoking the second class mailing privileges of the Milwaukee Leader on the ground that articles
were constantly appearing in it which violated the Espionage Act.' 01 Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented, prin-"
cipally on the ground that there was no authorization to
the postmaster to deny second class privileges with regard
to future numbers of a paper because previous issues contained non-mailable matter. So while censorship seems to
be prohibited under our constitutional guaranties the Postmaster General has been made a virtual censor in this indirect way. It is submitted that any appreciable extension
of this power would amount to a violation of the constitutional guaranty. As it is the power should be lodged in
02
some impartial tribunal.
" Ex parts Jackson, suPra.
" Rast v. Dan Deman, 240 U. S. 842 (1915).
W U. S. ComI'. STAT. §10381 (1918).
Ex parte Jackson, supra.
244 Fed. 535 (1917).
200246 Fed. 24.
201 Milwaukee Social Democrat Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1920).
BuanocK, THE AmESIcAN CONSTITUTION 870.
'=2 See 4. N. CAB. L. Rrv. 24, 81-38.
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While the publishers of newspapers, magazines, and similar publications are protected by the constitutional guaranties to the same extent as the public at large, they enjoy
no additional immunity and are responsible for the abuse
of the right of free publication on the same principles as
other persons. 10 3 Statutes prohibiting the publication and
circulation of pernicious advertising constitute a lawful exercise of the police power and do not invade the constitutional guaranty.10 4
While the scope of this paper does not include a discussion of the control of the press by agencies other than
the law, at present in this country, it is by such other
agencies mainly that the press is or may be controlled. Thus
the control of news distributing agencies or the influence
of advertising patronage, may seriously abridge the liberty
of the press. As one writer puts it: "He who pays the
piper calls the tune." However the evil to be apprehended
from these sources is largely neutralized by the multiplicity of periodicals, affording abundant opportunity for
the presentation of all sides of any question. 10 5
It will be recalled that at common law a man was not
free to make false statements injuring the reputation of
another although made with good intentions. However in
the interest of the public welfare, utterances by such men
as legislators and judges in the discharge of their duties,
were held to be privileged. In other relations where the
public interest was less deeply involved, communications
were made subject only to a qualified privilege, being
actionable only if proved to be malicious as well as false.
It was about this doctrine of qualified privilege for the
discussion of men and measures as applied to charges of
seditious libel that the fiercest battles were fought and
the most famous statements made about the freedom of
speech and of the press. The reason for the gathering
of the forces at this point will plainly appear, when it is
noted that sedition is the name applied to certain efforts
10

Sweeney v. Baker et al, 8upra; State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, '6

S. W. 79

(1906) ; 12 C. J. 953.

It will be observed that President Green of the West Virginia Supreme Court in
the Sweeney Case says that "the liberty of the press consists in the right in the
conductor of a newspaper to print whatever he chooses without any rvevious license"
and sot without any previous restraint. Italics ours.
104 35 A. L. R. 12, note; HALE, LAW OF THE PaESS Ch. 6.

0 On this question see 66 Am. L. REV. 514; 5 V

A

.

L. REv. 226, 245; 24 SURVEY 865.
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to subvert or bring into contempt existing government, its
officers, and its laws. 0 6
The law of sedition had its origin in the natural disposition of a government to maintain itself. The severity of
the law has naturally varied with the character of the
ruler and the conception of government. Thus at common
law it was indictable to publish anything against the
constitution of the country, or the established system of
government. The law always, however, allowed a temperate discussion of public events and measures.
In the United States, where the government is responsible to the people, one would expect to find more freedom
in this particular. However, conceptions of the right of
government to be free from criticism have been from the
outset and still are unsettled in this country. Cooley expressed a doubt whether the common law principles on this subject would be considered to have been practically adopted
in the American states. 07 Certainly no prosecutions could
be maintained in the United States Courts for libels on the
general government since there is no Federal common law,
and there is now no statute, and never was except during
the brief existence of the Sedition Law of 1798 and the
recent wartime legislation, which assumed to confer any
such power. The former, passed when the government was
new and many men feared that heated party discussions
might disrupt it, has had its constitutionality denied or
questioned by Cooley, 08 Schofield, Jefferson, Madison, Calhoun, Tucker, Von Holst and Freund. 0 9 Bilke and Willoughby took the view that Congress might punish seditious
libel.1' 0 However there was no effort to assert such a right
after the prosecutions under the act of 1798 until the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Seditious Libel
Amendment thereto in 1918. Though these were war time
measures the agitation for peace legislation embodying
some of their features make them of more than historical
interest and value.
1NHALE,

LAW OF THE PRESS 280.

As Paterson puts it: "A seditious libel, therefore, in its shortest definition, consists
in 'any words which tend to incite people immediately to take other than legal courses
to alter what the government has in charge.' " PATESSON, LIBERTY OF PRESS, SPEECH
AND

PUBLIC
107
'-o
lO

WORSHIP

81.

COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed.)

618.

Idem.
See 85 CENT. L. J. 62.

n"Iden.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held all

of the provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, and paragraphs 3 and 5 definitely, and 1 and 2 apparently, of the
1
Sedition Act of 1918, constitutional."

Your attention is

11 2
directed to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Sedition Act,

which, on their face, constitute the severest restriction upon
freedom of speech and the press ever enacted in the United

States. However the federal judges have, to some extent
at least, ameliorated their harshness. The prosecutions
under these acts have given rise to certain difficult and
far reaching questions of construction.
One problem was to decide whether or not guilt was

to be limited to those cases where there was a direct appeal
to persons to violate the law, or was to include as well the

use of the language the reasonable tendency of which was
to produce such illegal conduct, and again on whether the
remote or immediate tendency of the language to produce
the evils aimed at was to be taken as a test. The courts
have disagreed on this question.1 13
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the Debs Case, makes the "probable
effect" of the language the test. And later, in sustaining

the verdict of guilty in the Frohwerk Case, in the same vein
he remarks:

"But we must take the case on the record as it is,
and in that record it is impossible to say that it might not
have been found that the circulation of the paper was in
m11Schenel v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U. S. 204 (1919) : Debs v.United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1939) ; Abrams v.United States,
250 U. S. 616 (1919).
122 The paragraphs referred to bring under the penalties of the act:
(1) Those who write or utter any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language
about (a) the form of government, or (b) the Ccnstitutin. or (c) the flag, or (d) the
military or naval forces, or (e) the uniform of the army or navy, of the United States.
(2) Those who write or utter any language intended to bring (a) the form of
government, or (b) the Constitution, or (c )the military or naval forces, or (d) .the
uniform of the army or navy, of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely,
or disrepute.
,"Judge Hand, for example, took the following position in Lasses Pub. Co., V.
Patten: "If ond stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or to their
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation. If that be not the test, I can see no escape from the conclusion
that under this section every political agitation which can be shown to be apt to
produce a seditious temper is illegal. I am confident that by such languagd Congress had
no such revolutionary purpose in view * * * * Political agitation, by the passions it
arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to violation of the
law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of
the authority which puts them into execution, and it would be folly to disregard the
causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with
direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of
political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government."
In contrast with this test laid down by Judge Hand, the Court of Appeals, in discussing the same case, said: "If the natural and reasonable effect of what Is said is
to encourage resistance to the law, and the words are used in the endeavor to persuade to
resistance, it is immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned." N. 100, Vupea.
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quarters where a little breach would be enough to kindle
a flame and that the fact was known to and relied upon
by those who sent the paper out."
Although many of the federal courts seem to have
adopted the remote tendency of the language as the test,
thus making any criticism of the existing law precarious,
it is submitted that Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for an
unanimous court in the Schenck Case, enunciated the best
test yet devised when he said:
"The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done. The most stringent
15rotection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting 'Fire!' in a theater and causing a panic.
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that have all the effect of force. The
question in each case is whether the words were used in
such circumstances and iare of such a nature as to createl
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and no court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." 1 4
Within a short time after the Supreme Court had impliedly assented to the "clear and present danger" criterion of liability, reemphasized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Schaefer Case, the case of Pierce v. United States was decided, wherein the majority opinion, through Mr. Justice
Pitney, apparently adopts the doctrines technically known as
114 Italics ours. In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920), Mr. Justice Brandeis re-emphasized the "clear and present danger" criterion of liability, and the majority
of the court did not dispute his test. He speaks to this point in the following words:
.But as this court has declared, and as Professor Chafee has shown In his 'Freedom
of Speech in War Time," 32 HAav. L. REV. 932, 963, the test to be applied--as In the
case of criminal attempts and incitements-is not the remote or possible effect. There
must be the clear and present danger. * * * * * The extent to which Congress may
under the Constitution interfere with free speech was in Schenck v. United States
" * * declared by a unanimous court to be this: 'The question In every case is whether
the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
This is a rule of reason. Correctly applied it will protect the right of free speech both
from suppression by tyrannous, well meaning majorities, and from abuse by Irresponsile, fanati6al minorities. Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be
applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment; and to the exercise of good
judgment, calmness is, in times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion,
ts essential as fearlessness and honesty. The question whether, in a particular Inetance, the words spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free
speech, Is, under the rule enunciated by the court, one of 'egree.
And because It Is
a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment Is, necessarily,
a wide one. But its field is not unlimited."
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"indirect causation" and "constructive intent" as a source

of liability.

Under such construction as this espionage acts

and similar statutes are likely to be enforced most severely.'11
If the majority of the Supreme Court did apply the

"indirect causation" and "constructive intent" tests as a
basis for liability under the Espionage Act that would seem

to explain the disagreement of the judges through the
group of decisions beginning with the Abrams Case. At least

the court has not plainly overruled the Schenck Case and we
find Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the case of Gilbert v. Minnesota,11 3 again asserting the "clear and present danger" test.
Although the court did not pass upon the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act in the Abrams Case, Mr. Justice Holmes'
closing paragraph in this case leaves little to be said in conclusion on the subject of seditious libel. He said:
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems
to me to be perfectly logical.

If you have no doubt of

115Professor Goodrich explains the meaning of the doctrines mentioned, in the
following words: "Admit that the evil the statute is aimed to prevent is one regarding
which Congress has power to exercise preventive measures, causing insubordination in
the army, for instance. What words come within the penalty of the law? May al
speech which might be said to have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts
in violation of law be punished, or only words which directly incite to acts in violation
of law? Suppose that a man criticises army food, do not his words have some
tendency, at least in the mind of a jury with a strong imagination and in thorough
sympathy with the war, to cause unrest and subsequent insubordination among soldiers?
And it wouldn't matter, would it, whether the words were said directly to a soldier, or
to a woman's club, some of whose members had relatives or friends in the army? Under
this doctrine of "indirect causation" words can be punished for supposed bad tendency
long before the probability arises that they will break into unlawful acts. It is obvious
that this test of liability is in sharp contrast with the 'clear and present danger' rule
of Mr. Justice Holmes. * * * * * *
"Hand in hand with this 'indirect causation' doctrine goes that of 'constructive intent.' The only intent the defendant must have, is intent to write or speak the words
he did. If the words have a bad tendency he will presume the man intended unlawful
consequences, on the ground that he is presumed to intend the conquences of his acts.
Now we have many places in the law where a man is liable for consequences even
when he did not specifically intend them. If he shot off a gun at random in a crowded
street, and killed someone, he certainly could not escape punishment by saying he didn't
intend to kill his victim. We can say that he is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his act,. which is pure fiction. We may accurately say that specific intent to hit the very person he did, is not by JAw required in order to
to hold him liable. But often crimes do require a specific intent, and if they
do, such intent, must be proved. When a penal statute, such as the Espionage Act,
makes certain speech a crime, such as adtocating curtailment of production of things
necessary to the prosecution of the war, 'with intent * * * to hinder * * * the United

States in the prosecution of the war,' must not the words be taken in their literal
sense? To go back to the answer of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Abrams-Case: 'They
would be absurd in any other. A patriot might think that we were wasting money
on aeroplanes, or making more cannon of a certain kind that we needed, and might
advocate curtailment with success; yet even if it turned out that the curtailment hindered
the United States in the prosecution of the war, no one would hold such conduct a
crime.' " 19 Mica. L. Rlv. 496-498.
Justice Brandeis said: "Like the course of the
Ila254 U. S. 325, 336 (1920).
heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant of the struggle between contending
forces. In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise in governmental action, and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest periL There are times
when those charged with the responsibility of government, faced with clear and present
danger, may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is imperative, because the
emergency does -ot permit reliance upon the slower conquest of error by truth. And
in such emergencies the power to suppress exists." Italics ours.
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your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition
by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech

impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the
circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths they may come to believe. even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at dny rate is
the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as
all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is
a part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loath and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the
law that an immediate check is required to save the
country. I wholly disagree with the argument of the
government that the first amendment left the common
law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me
against the notion. I had conceived that the United
States through many years had shown its repentance
for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it
imposed. Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time
warrants making any exception to the sweeping command
'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging freedom of
speech'"na

:Itis difficult if not impossible to escape the force of
the argument contained in this pertinent bit of pragmatic
philosophy. It certainly contains a counsel of wisdom for
those who are responsible for the enactment and judicial
construction of peace-time legislation on this subject.
The position of the Supreme Court with respect to
constitutional freedom of speech and press seems to be that
Congress may forbid words which are intended to endanger
national interests if in the exercise of a fair legislative discretion it finds it "necessary and proper" to do so; and that
"f Italics ours.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss1/3

32

Michael: Freedom of the Press Under Our Constitution
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONS 61

the intent of the accused in uttering the alleged forbidden
words may be presumed from the reasonable consequences
of such words, though the presumption is rebuttable; and
finally that the findings of juries in this class of cases will
be treated on appeal like other penal cases. However the
sounder view seems to be that Congress should be limited
to forbidding words which are of a nature "to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about certain sub'17
stantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.'
Advocates of both views would probably agree with Mill
that "even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed, are such as to constitute
their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous
act.""1 7 a In fact this is the ground of the decision in the Debs
Case. Under either view the cause of freedom of speech
and press is largely in the custody of a constantly changing
public opinion operating through legislative majorities,
courts and juries, which seems to be where the framers of
the Constitution intended to place it.
Enemies of established government, whether right or
wrong, commonly believe themselves to be in the right, and
their followers look upon them as prophets. If they are
punished for their belief, they acquire the power of martyrs, while if they are opposed only with argument and
education, they usually lose all influence in a short while. 118
The future of the Espionage Act is doubtful. On the
one hand there is a decided demand for some such law to
suppress bolshevism and similar movements against the
government. On the other hand there is an agitation for
the removal of all restrictions upon speech and press on the
ground that such restrictions are no longer necessary." 9
Remembering, that for our purposes, our only interest in
the past is for the light it throws upon the present, and the
predictions of what the courts will do in the future; that
an ingenious research for and adherence to dogma is not so
important as a study of the ends sought to be attained and
the reasons for desiring them; that there are some other
forces besides logic at work in the development of lawwhich clearly show that the means do not exist for deter11 In accbrd vith this view see BURDICK,
TION 369.
1175 Italics ours.
"1 6 VA. L. REv. 399.
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minations which shall be good for all time-and a given decision "can do no more than embody the preference of a given
body at a given time and place," it is of the essence of improvement that we strive to get behind rules of law to human facts,
to the desires and needs of the individual human being who
wants to speak and those of the great group of human beings
among whom he speaks. In other words, there are individual interests and social interests, which must be balanced
against each other, if they conflict, in order to determine
which interest shall be sacrificed under particular circumstances and which shall be protected and become the foundation of a legal right.1 20 However, it is conceded that the
socialization theory, just presented, is not always a very
helpful suggestion practically, 121 although, as has been recently pointed out, the modern trend of judicial thinking
seems to favor its extension.'
At least, it is no less true
here than it is elsewhere that the end of the law is to
secure the greatest good to the greatest number.
In conclusion we find our problem reduced to the state
of the man who was brought before the court for carelessly
swinging his arms and hitting a man in the nose. He protested that this was a free country and a man had the right
to swing his arms. "Yes," said the court, "but your right
to swing your arms ends where the other man's nose begins." In a larger sense, then, a man's right to speak and
to write must be curbed when, in the wisdom of our courts,
legislatures and juries, it transgresses other constitutionally
protected individual rights or interferes with the proper
preservation of the social compact and the body politic.
All through the ages, as we have seen, men in whom the
desire for a free press burned the brightest have unanimously proclaimed that some restraint is always necessary.
They have seldom agreed as to the precise places where
the lines should be drawn, since the rules and principles
applicable in this field cannot be ascertained with that certainty which obtains, for example, in the field of property
law. "The gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," which has served so well in the interpretation of
other constitutional provisions by blocking out concrete
12

See 10 HARV.

L. REv. 457; CHAFEE, FREEDom op SPEECH 85.

121 See note 18 MicH. L. REv. 37.
= See Professor Hardman's article entitled "Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend,"
82 W. VA. L. QUAs. 163.
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situations on each side of the line until the line itself becomes plain, has been of little value when applied to the
First Amendment because the cases are too varied in character to determine the fundamental principle on which
the classification of precedents, in their respective boundaries, is based.1 i However it is not hard to distinguish between an honest expression of opinion and vituperation,
between constructive criticism and sedition. For any government to fail to attach legal responsibility for language
which imminently imperils the public safety or infringes upon
those inalienable rights, for the perpetuation of which governments are instituted among men, would be suicidal. On
the other hand it is only in despotisms that one must speak
in whispers, or in the dark, on matters touching the common
welfare. It is the golden mean between these two intolerable extremes which our fundamental law, as interpreted
by the courts, seeks to maintain.
2=

CHAFF,
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